EU strategy to counteract propaganda
24. Welcomes the Action Plan on Strategic Communication; welcomes the joint
communication on the ‘Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats’ and calls for the
endorsement and implementation of its recommendations without delay; stresses that the
actions proposed require the cooperation and coordination of all relevant actors at EU and
national level; is of the opinion that only a comprehensive approach can lead to the
success of EU efforts; calls on the Member States holding the rotating presidency of the
EU to always include strategic communications as part of their programme in order to
ensure continuity of work on this topic; welcomes the initiatives and achievements of the
Latvian Presidency in this regard; calls on the VP/HR to ensure frequent communication
at political level with the Member States in order to better coordinate EU actions; stresses
that cooperation between the EU and NATO in the field of strategic communication
should be substantially strengthened; welcomes the intention of the Slovak Presidency to
organise a conference on totalitarianism on the occasion of the European Day of
Remembrance for Victims of the Totalitarian Regimes;
25. Requests that the competent EU institutions and authorities closely monitor the sources of
financing of anti-European propaganda;
26. Emphasises that more funding is necessary to support freedom of the media in the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries within the scope of EU democracy
instruments; calls on the Commission in this respect to ensure the full exploitation of
existing instruments such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR), the ENP, the Eastern Partnership Media Freedom Watch and the EED with
regard to the protection of media freedom and pluralism;
27. Notes the huge resources dedicated to propaganda activities by Russia and the possible
impact of hostile propaganda on decision-making processes in the EU and the
undermining of public trust, openness and democracy; commends the significant work
accomplished by the EU Strategic Communication Task Force; calls therefore for the EU
Strategic Communication Task Force to be reinforced by turning it into a fully fledged
unit within the EEAS, responsible for the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, with
proper staffing and adequate budgetary resources, possibly by y means of an additional
dedicated budget line; calls for enhanced cooperation among the Member States’
intelligence services with a view to assessing the influence exerted by third countries
seeking to undermine the democratic foundation and values of the EU; calls for closer
cooperation between Parliament and the EEAS on strategic communication, including
through the use of the Parliament’s analytical capacities and Information Offices in the
Member States;
28. Stresses that it is essential for the EU to continue to actively promote through its external
actions respect for fundamental rights and freedoms; considers that supporting freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly, the right to access information and the independence of
the media in the neighbouring countries should underpin the EU’s actions in counteracting
propaganda;
29. Underlines the need to strengthen media plurality and the objectivity, impartiality and
independence of the media within the EU and its neighbourhood, including non-state
actors, inter alia through support for journalists and the development of capacity-building
programmes for media actors, fostering information-exchange partnerships and networks,
such as content-sharing platforms, media-related research, mobility and training
opportunities for journalists and placements with EU-based media to facilitate exchanges
of best practices;
30. Highlights the important role of quality journalism education and training inside and
outside the EU in order to produce quality journalistic analyses and high editorial
standards; argues that promoting the EU values of freedom of the press and expression
and media plurality includes supporting persecuted and imprisoned journalists and human
rights defenders in third countries;
31. Advocates stronger cooperation between the EU institutions, the European Endowment
for Democracy (EED), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
the Council of Europe and the Member States in order to avoid duplication and ensure
synergy in similar initiatives;
32. Is dismayed at the major problems relating to the independence and freedom of the media
in certain Member States, as reported by international organisations such as Reporters
Without Borders; calls on the EU and the Member States to take appropriate measures to
improve the existing situation in the media sector, with a view to ensuring that EU
external action in support of freedom, impartiality and independence of the media is
credible;
33. Asks the Strategic Communication Task Force, thus reinforced as proposed and under the
Twitter username @EUvsDisInfo, to establish an online space where the public at large
can find a range of tools for identifying disinformation, with an explanation of how they
work, and which can act as a relay for the many civil society initiatives focused on this
issue;
34. Affirms that an efficient communication strategy must include local communities in
discussions about EU actions, provide support for people-to-people contact, and give
proper consideration to cultural and social exchanges as key platforms for combating the
prejudices of local populations; recalls that, in this regard, EU delegations must maintain
direct contact with local grassroots stakeholders and representatives of civil society;
35. Underlines that incitement of hatred, violence or war cannot ‘hide’ behind freedom of
expression; encourages legal initiatives to be taken in this regard to provide more
accountability when dealing with disinformation;
36. Highlights the importance of communicating EU policies coherently and effectively,
internally as well as externally, and of providing tailored communications to specific
regions, including access to information in local languages; welcomes, in this context, the
launch of the EEAS website in Russian as a first step in the right direction and encourages
the translation of the EEAS website into more languages, such as Arabic and Turkish;
37. Underlines the responsibility of Member States to be active, preventative, and cooperative
in countering hostile information operations on their territories or aimed at undermining
their interests; urges the governments of Member States to develop their own strategic
communications capabilities;
38. Calls on each Member State to make the EU Strategic Communication Task Force’s two
weekly newsletters The Disinformation Digest and The Disinformation Review available
to their citizens in order to create awareness among the general public of propaganda
methods used by third parties;
39. Insists on the difference between propaganda and criticism;
40. Stresses that while not all criticism of the EU or its policies necessarily constitutes
propaganda or disinformation, particularly when in the context of political expression,
instances of manipulation or support linked to third countries and intended to fuel or
exacerbate this criticism provide grounds to question the reliability of these messages;
41. Stresses that while a stand has to be taken against anti-EU propaganda and disinformation
by third countries, this should not cast doubt on the importance of maintaining
constructive relations with third countries and making them strategic partners in tackling
common challenges;
42. Welcomes the adoption of the Action Plan on Strategic Communication and the
establishment of the East StratCom Team within the European External Action Service
(EEAS) with the aim of communicating EU policies and countering anti-EU propaganda
and disinformation; calls for strategic communication to be further stepped up; believes
that the efficiency and transparency of the work of the East StratCom Team needs to be
further improved; invites the EEAS to develop criteria for measuring the efficiency of its
work; highlights the importance of ensuring sufficient financing and adequate staffing of
the East StratCom Team;
43. Notes that the Disinformation Review published by the East StratCom Task Force has to
meet the standards provided for in the IFJ Declaration of Principles on the Conduct of
Journalists; emphasises that the review must be drafted in an appropriate manner, without
using offensive language or value judgments; invites the East StratCom Task Force to
revisit the criteria used for drafting the review;
44. Believes that an efficient strategy to counteract anti-EU propaganda could be the adoption
of measures to provide a target audience with adequate and interesting information about
EU activities, European values and other issues of public interest, and underlines that
modern technologies and social networks could be used for these purposes;
45. Calls on the Commission to advance certain legal initiatives in order to be more effective
and accountable in dealing with disinformation and propaganda and to use the midterm
review of the European Neighbourhood Instrument to promote the strengthening of the
resilience of the media as a strategic priority; calls on the Commission to conduct a
thorough review of the efficiency of existing EU financial instruments and to come
forward with a proposal for a comprehensive and flexible solution which can provide
direct support to independent media outlets, think tanks and NGOs especially in the target
group native language and enable the channelling of additional resources to organisations
that have the ability to do so, such as the European Endowment for Democracy while
curtailing financial flows aimed at financing individuals and entities engaged in stratcom
activities, incitement to violence and hatred; calls on the Commission to conduct a
thorough audit of the efficiency of certain big scale media projects funded by the EU, such
as Euronews;
46. Underlines the importance of awareness raising, education, online media and information
literacy in the EU and in the Neighbourhood with a view to empowering citizens to
critically analyse media content in order to identify propaganda; stresses in this sense the
importance of strengthening knowledge on all levels of the educational system; points out
the need for encouraging people to active citizenship and for developing their awareness
as media consumers; underlines the central role of online tools, especially social media
where the spread of false information and the launch of disinformation campaigns are
easier and often face no hurdles; recalls that countering propaganda with propaganda is
counterproductive, and therefore understands that the EU, as a whole, and the Member
States, individually, can only fight propaganda by third parties by rebutting disinformation
campaigns and making use of positive messaging and information and should develop a
truly effective strategy which would be differentiated and adapted to the nature of the
actors disseminating propaganda; recognises that the financial crisis and the advance of
new forms of digital media have posed serious challenges for quality journalism;
47. Expresses concern at the use of social media and online platforms for criminal hate speech
and incitement to violence, and encourages the Member States to adapt and update
legislation to address ongoing developments, or to fully implement and enforce existing
legislation on hate speech, both offline and online; argues that greater collaboration is
needed with online platforms and with leading internet and media companies;
48. Calls on the Member States to provide and ensure the necessary framework for quality
journalism and variety of information by combating media concentrations, which have a
negative impact on media pluralism;
49. Notes that media education provides knowledge and skills, and empowers citizens to
exercise their right to freedom of expression, to critically analyse media content and to
react to disinformation; highlights, therefore, the need to raise awareness of the risks of
disinformation through media literacy actions at all levels, including through a European
information campaign around media, journalistic and editorial ethics and by fostering
better cooperation with social platforms and promoting joint initiatives to address hate
speech, incitement to violence and online discrimination;
50. Notes that no soft power strategy can succeed without cultural diplomacy and promotion
of intercultural dialogue between and within countries, in the EU and beyond; encourages,
therefore, long-term public and cultural diplomacy actions and initiatives, such as
scholarships and exchange programmes for students and young professionals, including
initiatives to support intercultural dialogue, strengthen cultural links with the EU and
promote common cultural links and heritage, and the provision of proper training for staff
of EU delegations and the EEAS to equip them with adequate intercultural skills;
51. Believes that public media should set the example of how to provide impartial and
objective information in compliance with the best practices and ethics of journalism;
52. Underlines that particular attention should be paid to new technologies – including digital
broadcasting, mobile communications, online media and social networks, including those
of a regional character – which facilitate the dissemination of information about, and
increased awareness of, the European values enshrined in the Treaties; recalls that such
communications must be of a high standard, contain concrete best practices and highlight
the EU’s impact on third countries, including EU humanitarian assistance as well as the
opportunities and benefits that closer association and cooperation with the EU bring for
the citizens of third countries, in particular for young people, such as visa-free travel or
capacity-building, mobility and exchange programmes where applicable;
53. Highlights the need to ensure that the new ENP portal – currently being developed in the
framework of the OPEN Neighbourhood Programme – does not only accumulate content
addressed to expert communities, but that it also contains a section customised for larger
audiences; is of the opinion that the portal should contain a section on the Eastern
Partnership, bringing together information on initiatives currently fragmented between
numerous websites;
54. Points to the potential of popular culture and entertainment-education (EE) as a means of
articulating shared human values and communicating EU policies;
55. Stresses its support for initiatives such as the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence in Riga,
NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) or the
Radicalisation Awareness Network Centre of Excellence; underlines the need for utilising
their findings and analysis and strengthening EU analytical capabilities at all levels; calls
for the Commission and the Member States to initiate similar projects, engage in the
training of journalists, support independent media hubs and media diversity, encourage
networking and cooperation between media and think tanks and exchange best practices
and information in these areas;
56. Condemns the regular crackdowns on the independent media, journalists and civil society
activists in Russia and occupied territories, including Crimea since its illegal annexation;
stresses that since 1999, dozens of journalists have been killed, disappeared without trace
or have been imprisoned in Russia; calls on the Commission and Member States to
reinforce the protection of journalists in Russia and in the EU’s Neighbourhood and to
support Russian civil society and invest in people-to-people contacts; calls for the
immediate release of journalists; notes that the EU is strengthening relations with its
Eastern partners and other neighbours, and is also keeping the lines of communication
with Russia open; recognises that the biggest obstacle to Russian disinformation
campaigns would be the existence of independent and free media in Russia itself;
considers that achieving this should be the goal of the EU; calls for special attention and
sufficient resources to be provided for media pluralism, local media, investigative
journalism and foreign language media, particularly in Russian, Arabic, Farsi, Turkish and
Urdu as well as other languages spoken by populations vulnerable to propaganda;
57. Supports communication campaigns carried out by relevant actors in Syria, Iraq and in the
region (including in the countries of origin of foreign fighters) to discredit ISIL/Daesh’s
ideology and denounce its violations of human rights, and to counter violent extremism
and hate speech linked to other groups in the region; calls on the EU and its Member
States, in their dialogue with MENA countries, to emphasise that good governance,
accountability, transparency, the rule of law and respect for human rights are essential prerequisites
to protect these societies from the spread of intolerant and violent ideologies
that inspire terrorist organisations such as ISIL/Daesh and Al-Qaeda; in the face of the
growing terrorist threat from ISIL/Daesh and other international terrorist organisations,
underlines the need to strengthen cooperation on security issues with countries, which
have extensive experience in combating terrorism;
58. Calls on the VP/HR and the Council to confirm the EU’s full support for the ongoing
implementation process and to contribute financially to the realisation of the
recommendations of the feasibility study on ‘Russian-language Media Initiatives in the
Eastern Partnership and Beyond’, conducted the European Endowment for Democracy in
59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, Member
States, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EEAS and NATO.